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little.gif (1471 bytes)THE FALL OFTHE ALAMO ~ page 10

expressed a sincere feeling, in which his companions shared; for such fancies are apt to take a strong contagious hold of men who stand day after day unharmed within step of death: it is a time when the fierce, profane and dissolute often begin for the first time to look upward. It is worthy of note, that although the readiness of couriers to go out indicates a consciousness that the chance of life was at least as good without as within, we know not of a single case of night flitting. Brute bravery or reckless despair would hardly have produced this without some exceptions. The incident of the sentinel at the postern probably showed what were prevailing traits--scorn of desertion with readiness for hope. In many a rough bosom that hope had probably a new and half-comprehended faith under it. Though the hope vas disappointed, I trust that the faith was not all in vain.

In stating the force of the garrison during the previous ten days Travis did not include the little reinforcement which had come in only to days before; yet, as he mentions but 145, while the garrison is known to have numbered 156 when the enemy appeared, he must have rated eleven as ineffective or absent. A part of them may have been counted out as departed couriers, and the rest had perhaps sunk under the fatigue of duty. Had there been any wound he would probably have referred to them.

On the 4th of March Santa Ana called a council of war, and fixed on the morning of the 6th for the final assault. The besieging force now around the Alamo, comprising all the Mexican troops which had yet arrived, consisted of the two dragoon regiments of Dolores and Tampico, which formed a brigade, commanded by General Andrade, two companies or batteries of artillery under Colonel Ampudia, and six battalions of infantry, namely, Los Zapadores (engineer troops), Jimenes. Guerrero, Matamoros, Toluca and Tres Villas. These six battalions of foot were to form the storming forces. The order for the attack, which I have read, but have no copy of, was full and precise in its details, and was signed by General Amador, as Chief of Staff. The infantry were directed at a certain hour between midnight and dawn to form at convenient distances from the fort in four columns of attack and a reserve. These dispositions were not made by battalions, for the light companies of all were incorporated with the Zapadores to form the reserve, and other transpositions were made. A certain number of scaling ladders, axes and fascines were to be borne by particular columns. A commanding officer, with a second to replace him in case of accident, was named, and a point of attack designated for each column. The

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