At Goliad, did Fannin withhold details of key
surrender terms from his men?

June 1999

Amid the controversy and uncertainty that will likely forever rage over motive and competence of Colonel James Fannin, over ethics of Centralista despots and field commanders, and points of law surrounding the Goliad Massacre and terms of capitulation at Encinal del Perdido, there is one certainty in this writer's mind. The Colonel DID NOT misrepresent his views on surrender and terms of surrender to his men or to his enemies.

Misrepresentation of the terms would have required an extensive conspiracy of officers and eyewitnesses, some of whom survived and wrote extensive accounts of events. Terms of surrender are remarkably consistent among Texian accounts. Surely others besides Col. Fannin read or had read to them the written English version of the terms on which they based their consistent accounts.

Surviving Commander of the Alabama Red Rovers and surgeon Dr. Jack Shackelford:

...I remarked to him [Col. Fannin], that I would not oppose a surrender, provided we could obtain an honourable capitulation; one, on which he could rely: that if he could not obtain such...come back...our graves are already dug...let us all be buried together. To these remarks the men responded in a firm and determined manner; and the Colonel assured us, that he never would surrender on any other terms. He returned in a short time thereafter, and communicated the substance of an agreement entered into by Gen. Urea and himself.

"1st. That we should be received and treated as prisoners of war according to the usages of the most civilized nations. 2d, That private property should be respected and restored: that the side arms of the officers should be given up. 3d. That the men should be sent to Copano, and thence to the United States in eight days, or so soon thereafter as vessels could be procured to take them. 4th. That the officers should be paroled and return to the United States in like manner."

...and the following treaty was concluded upon, and solemnly ratified: a copy of it in Spanish was retained by General Urea, and one in English by Colonel Fannin. Seeing the Texian army entirely overpowered by a far superior force, and to avoid the effusion of blood, we surrender ourselves prisoners of war, under the following terms:

Art. 1st, That we should be received and treated as prisoners of war, according to the usages of civilized nations. Art. 2d. That the officers should be paroled immediately upon their arrival at La Bahia, and the other prisoners should be sent to Copano, within eight days, there to await shipping to convey them to the

United States, so soon as it was practicable to procure it: no more to take up arms against Mexico, until exchanged. Art. 3d. That all private property should be respected, and officers' swords should be returned on parole or release.

Art. 4th. That our men should receive every comfort, and be fed as well as their own men. Signed, Gen. UREA, Col MORATEAS, Col. HOBZINGER, on the part of the enemy; and on our part, signed by Col. FANNIN, and Maj. WALLACE.

The substance of the Mexican officer's communication (as I understood at the time) was to the effect "that Gen. Urrea, the commander of the Mexican forces, being anxious to avoid the useless shedding of blood (seeing we were now completely in his power), would guarantee to Col. Fannin and his men, on his word of honor as an officer and gentleman, that we would be leniently dealt with, provided we surrendered at discretion, without further attempt at hopeless resistance." When this message was delivered to Col. Fannin he sent word back to the officer "to say to Gen. Urrea, it was a waste of time to discuss the subject of surrendering at discretion...that he would fight as long as there was a man left to fire a gun before he would surrender on such terms."

.[After white flags went up from both sides] Col. Fannin and Major Wallace went out to meet them, and the terms of capitulation were finally agreed upon, the most important of which was, that we should be held as prisoners of war until exchanged, or liberated on our parole of honor not to engage in the war again at the option of the Mexican commander in chief. There were minor articles included in it, such as that our side arms should be retained, etc. When the terms of capitulation had been fully decided upon, Gen. Urrea and his secretary and interpreter came into our lines with Col. Fannin, where it was reduced to writing, and an English translation given to Col. Fannin which was read to our men.

...[capitulation], as understood, were the sentiments of the party generally. When the matter was first proposed to Col. Fannin, he was for holding out longer, saying: "'We whipped them off yesterday, and we can do so again today.".After some parley a capitulation with General Urrea was agreed upon, the terms of which were that we should lay down our arms and surrender ourselves as prisoners of war; that we should be treated as such, according to the usage of civilized nations. That our wounded men should be taken back to Goliad and properly attended to and that all private property should be respected. These were the terms that Col. Fannin distinctly told his men on his return, had been agreed upon, and which was confirmed by Major Wallace and Captain Dusangue, the interpreter..We were told that the articles of capitulation were reduced to writing and signed by the commander of each side and one or two of their principal officers; that the writings were in duplicate, and each commander retained a copy..We were also told, though I cannot vouch for the authority, that as soon as possible we should be sent to New Orleans under parole not to serve any more against Mexico during the war in Texas; but it seemed to be confirmed by an observation of the Mexican Colonel Holzinger, who was to superintend the receiving of our arms. As we delivered them up, he exclaimed: "Well, gentlemen, in ten days, liberty and home."

...When the two commanders met at a proper distance from their respective armies, the Mexican General Urrea embraced Col. Fannin and said, 'Yesterday we fought; but today we are friends.'

Articles of capitulation were soon agreed upon by the two commanders, and committed to writing with the necessary signatures and formalities. The articles were, that in consideration of our surrendering, our lives should be ensured, our personal property restored, and we were to be treated, in all respects, as prisoners of war are treated among enlightened nations. We also received a verbal promise to be sent, in eight days, to the nearest port, to be transported to the United States.

...I asked Col. Fanning upon what conditions he was to surrender his arms. He told me that our lives and our private property were guaranteed to us; that we were to give up to the Mexicans all of the Texas property that was in our possession, and that as soon as they got their provisions out of their vessels that were at Copino, that all of us who belonged in the States were to be sent to New Orleans; and that what few prisoners they had, that belonged to Texas they were to retain as prisoners of war until exchanged.

"not for the independence of Texas and that had died a victim of his love for the Constitution of 1824, under the auspices of which he had come to the country and for which he went to the sacrifice gladly."

"They trusted our generosity too much...Fannin was one of those who had trusted our supposed humanitarianism; one had often heard him say, 'Oh, I have great faith in the honor and character of all Mexicans.'"

Wallace L. McKeehan

Either Fannin misled his men about the terms of the surrender at Coleto or he himself did not understand what he was signing, even though it was written in both Spanish and English.

 In Art[icle] 1 of the Surrender document it clearly states

 "we proposed to them to surrender ourselves at discretion, to which they agreed".

Holzingers "Eight days and home" may have influenced the decision, making the signers on the Texian side even more sure that they would be spared and would soon be on their way home. Urrea himself added on the surrender document

 
"when the white flag was raised by the enemy, I ordered their leader to be informed that I could have no other agreement than that they should surrender at discretion, without any other condition, and this was agreed to by the persons stated above;(Wallace, Chadwick and Fannin) the other petitions, which the subscribers of this surrender make will not be granted. I told them this, and they agreed to it, for I must not, nor can I, grant anything else".

It seems to me that Fannin misunderstood what was actually going on and in his haste to provide solace to his wounded, tired and outnumbered men he chose to overlook what the actual outcome could be and set in motion events that would culminate on Palm Sunday. 

From: Gary Brown
Date: June 7, 1999

Confronted with Urrea's newly-arrived artillery, Fannin's immediate response...and probably the only option he had left that morning...was to call another "council of war" and confer with his officers.  Although some...the Red Rovers and the Greys...advocated fighting on, the majority of Texans inside the square that morning favored negotiations for "honorable" terms of surrender.

Fannin appears to have drafted a document that guaranteed they would be considered prisoners of war, that their wounded would receive medical care, and that all prisoners would be paroled back to the United States and he apparently presented such a document to General Urrea through Holzinger only to have the Mexican commander refuse it outright...insisting instead that the Texans surrender unconditionally.

There was certainly reason for confusion about the negotiations and surrender document: discussions were conducted in English, Spanish and possibly even German and the final documents were written in both Spanish and English. But the final signed Spanish copy appears to be consistent and clear in the first article:

"...we proposed to them to surrender ourselves at descretion, to which they agreed".

"When the white flag was raised by the enemy, I ordered their leader to be informed that I could have no other agreement than that they should surrender at Discretion, without any other condition, and this was agreed to by the persons stated above; the other petitions, which the subscribers of this surrender make will not be granted.  I told them this, and they agreed to it, for I must not, nor can I, grant anything else."

In addition, Colonel Holzinger mingled among the Texans telling them "In eight days, home and liberty!"...a statement recalled later by almost every survivor.

The Texan volunteers, therefore, surrendered to the Mexican army thinking they were to be treated as prisoners of war and paroled to the United States.

Dr. Joseph Barnard later recorded:

"...After some parley a capitulation with General Urrea was agreed upon, the terms of which were that we should lay down our arms and surrender ourselves as prisoners of war; that we should be treated as such, according to the usage of civilized nations.

That our wounded men should be taken back to Goliad and properly attended to and that all private property should be respected...These were the terms that Col. Fannin distinctly told his men on his return, had been agreed upon, and which was confirmed by Major Wallace and Captain Dusangue, the interpreter...We were also told, though I cannot vouch for the authority, that as soon as possible we should be sent to New Orleans under parole not to serve any more against Mexico during the war in Texas; but it seemed to be confirmed by an observation of the Mexican Colonel Holzinger, who was to superintend the receiving of our arms."

Captain Jack Shackelford also recorded his observation of the surrender process which is similar to Barnard's except for Holzinger's alleged promise:

"the first words Colonal Holzinger uttered, after a very polite bow, were 'Well, gentleman, in eight days, liberty and home!"  I heard this distinctly."

Fannin's intentions and his actions in representing the Texans will probably never be established beyond a doubt, but it must also be remembered that he was obligated to act in the best immediate interests of his considerable number of wounded...many of whom had been lying on the cold and damp ground for over twelve hours.  Given the fact that he himself was wounded, it is possible that he may have honestly misunderstood the translation.

But he did not clearly relate the terms to his men that morning since the survivors, to a man, would later insist that General Urrea had reneged on his word.

From: Wallace L. McKeehan
Date: 11 June 1999

Caution should be exercised as Col. Fannin and his men found in trusting Centralista diablos including their archival documents. The following questions arise concerning the purported surrender document found by Dr. E. C. Barker in the Archives of the War Department in Mexico City:
 

1. Assuming the document is authentic, particularly the signatures of Wallace, Chadwick and Fannin, why was it not also signed by Centralista representatives including Gen. Urrea above the addendum?  Does this not alone invalidate the document?  Even the four article agreement in English reconstructed in detail by surviving Capt. Benjamin Holland in his account acknowledges signatures by both sides:

"Signed, Gen. UREA, Col MORATEAS, Col. HOBZINGER, on the part of the enemy; and on our part, signed by Col. FANNIN, and Maj. WALLACE."

2. Was the addendum added by Gen. Urrea done on 20 Mar 1836 or much later as cover-ups and recriminations among Centralista chameleons proceeded after the loss of Texas? Why was the addendum undated? Even if added in the period, it is likely, if part of the document is authentic, that it was signed before the addendum and the addendum was added without knowledge of the Texian commissioners, much less with their agreement to it.

3. Why were the words "nor wish" in Urrea's addendum in the War Archives not included in the copy of the capitulation later cited in his Diario which he edited and published in 1838 after Santa Anna's account of the Texas campaign in Manifesto published in 1837? In Urrea's diary, the phrase translates "I ought not, nor can I, grant any other terms."

4. Did Urrea admit himself that there was a "capitulation" in his official contemporary report only to change his story later after publication of Manifesto by Santa Anna?
 

(Translation by Carlos Casteñeda)

MINISTER OF WAR AND MARINE

Central Section Desk No. I. Division of Operations Most Excellent Sir---On the 19th Inst., the fort of Goliad was abandoned by the enemy after an attempt to fight this division. The said fortress is, therefore, at the disposal of the supreme government. The leader, Fannin, and his companions with more than three hundred soldiers (who capitulated) that were garrisoning the said fortress are likewise at its disposal.

Casteñeda notes: "Urrea in his Diario, published immediately after the Manifesto, says 'the phrase in the parenthesis [who capitulated] has been altered, for I wrote Que se titulaban [who called themselves such] and there is a vast difference between the two phrases evident from their very meaning, but specially so, given the circumstances.' This document is reproduced in the appendix to Urrea's Diario under the same number. It was published in the Diario del Gobierno, México, April 13, 1836, and also in the Alcance of El Mercurio, Matamoros, April 3, 1836. In both instances the phrase in question appears as 'que se titulaban.'"

Then as now the take home lesson is "Never trust a Centralista Diablo" (their followers, representatives and commissioners) whether that be Mao, Stalin, Hitler or Milosevic.

W.L.M.

Centralista Diablos? I thought that Fannin and his men surrendered to the official military representatives of the Mexican Govt. Why should the official papers signed by Fannin, Wallace and Chadwick where it is clearly stated that they were surrendering at Mexican discretion be doubted unless the Mexicans found a way, after executing the Texians to rewrite the documents and then get dead men to sign them. Like it or not Fannin made many mistakes in judgement and just maybe this may have been another one. He may have truly belived that the intervention of Gen. Urrea would save him and his men and in this belief he and his officers withheld the little tidbit that they were surrendering at discretion. Every man there knew of Santa Annas mandate of how to deal with land pirates and if they had known that they were surrendering at discretion and facing execution most would have probably prefered to fight it out. Urrea was a good officer and from his actions it is clear he wanted no part in the execution of Fannin and his men. He like many other officers in armies throughout time have faced orders they did not agree with and his commander in chief was not a good person to disagree with and unfortunately he has come down as a bloodthisty Centralista Diablo a title I dont agree with.

From: Wallace McKeehan
Date: June 15, 1999

Similar to Hitler's Desert Fox Rommel, respect for Urrea's superior performance as a field commander in the Texas campaign and his eloquence in self-defense after loss of Texas and ensuing inter-Centralista recriminations has periodically caused some to suggest that the "Fox of Durango" does not belong alongside his commander-in-chief in the war crimes dock.  He was a repeat offender---both in the offering of terms to induce surrender which he later denied and admitted were illegal under the letter of Mexican law and impossible for him to adhere to, and the brutal execution of the wounded and prisoners in his presence when he could have prevented it directly.

Within the one week of his major deception of the Fannin force at Coleto which led to massacre, witness the actions of the Fox of Durango:

From Urrea's own words, we have an example of his actions when in direct command on site and when the force to be captured was too small to be of consequence if they fought to the death.  Capt. King's force was sufficiently small and isolated that the Fox of Durango's subterfuge concerning terms of surrender were not necessary to induce their surrender and they were disposed of swiftly.  From Urrea's Diario:

 
"I authorized the execution, after my departure from camp, of thirty adventurers taken prisoners during the previous engagements, setting free those who were colonists or Mexicans."

Lewis T. Ayers related concerning Capt. King's men at the Mission Refugio:
 

 "......I should have mentioned that the two Germans and myself are the only survivors of the 33, one of these Germans soon after died from his wounds. The rest of our party were barbarously shot, stripped naked and left on the prairie about one mile from the Mission. . ."

The helpless and wounded at Mission Refugio posed no threat, therefore no subterfuge was needed to induce surrender, prior to executions at which the Fox of Durango was personally present and in command after Ward's departure. Henry Scott relates:
 

"Infuriated by the tremendous losses they had sustained the day before, the soldiers rushed upon the wounded Texian soldiers and their care-takers and bayoneted them with brutal cruelty......The scene was harassing; the muttered curses of vengeance against the 'diablos Tejanos'; the groans of the dying....."

".....When she went to make him a cup of tea, there were two dirty Mexicans wiping the blood off their swords and the poor boy was breathing his last; she said, "My poor boy," and one of them replied; "Here you got no boy."

Two days after his deception of Fannin's forces at Coleto, the Fox of Durango employed the same approach to induce surrender of Col. Ward's contingent.

Survivor Joseph Andrews relates:
 

 "......They came running in announcing the approach of the enemy---Council was held. Ward was for fight; but the most were for surrendering; the Mexicans hoisted a white flag---The surrender was made. They were to be treated as prisoners of war; and were to be sent back to the U S---They were marched to Victoria; thence to Goliad where they met with Fannin and his men all prisoners..."

Survivor Samuel T. Brown relates:
 

"The two men came within speaking distance of us, stated our situation and the power of the enemy, and desired Colonel Ward to see General Urrea upon the terms of surrender: upon which Colonel Ward, Major Mitchell, and Captain Ticknor, had an interview with General Urrea and returned, making known to us the offer of the enemy, if we surrendered prisoners of war, that we should be marched to Copano without delay, and from thence to New Orleans, or detained as prisoners of war and be exchanged. Colonel Ward addressed his men and said he was opposed to surrendering; that it was the same enemy we had beaten at the Mission, only much reduced in numbers, and that he thought our chance of escape equally practicable as it was then. He proposed that the attack on us might be evaded until night, when he might possibly pass the enemy's lines and get out of danger. At all events, he thought it best to resist every inch, as many of us as could save ourselves, and if we surrendered, he had doubts of the faith and humanity of the Mexicans; that he feared we should all be butchered. The vote of the company was taken, and a large majority were in favor of surrendering upon the terms proposed; Colonel Ward informed them that their wishes should govern, but if they were destroyed, no blame could rest on him.  The same officers as before, to wit: Colonel Ward, Major Mitchell, and Captain Ticknor, again saw General Urrea, and I understood a paper was signed by the Mexican general, to dispose of us as above stated, on condition that we should never serve Texas any more; one copy in Spanish, and another in English. Then came the hour for us to see all our hopes entirely blasted."

With the action with Ward's contingent, the Fox of Durango twice within days executed successfully his modis operandi---induction of surrender by deceit of a force for which he knew, as stated later in his Diaro, would otherwise fight to the death, a tactic which was ironically illegal under the letter of Mexican law, and dishonorable under any codes or laws of war.

The original question of this thread, whether Texian leaders misrepresented the terms of surrender to their men, can also be applied to Col. Ward as well as Fannin.  Both Fannin and Ward expressed reservation about surrender, both followed the wishes of the majority of their men, both obtained similar surrender terms from the Fox of Durango, and both met a similar fate at Goliad.  Being much more a "foreigner" in Mexican territory than was loyal Mexican Federalist Fannin, Ward appears to have more intensely expressed his distrust of the Mexican officials in regard to honoring terms of surrender, yet in the end followed the wishes of the majority of his men as did James Fannin.

W.L.M.

References:  Sons of DeWitt Colony:  Massacre at Goliad