From: Chuck Chappell
Date: Monday, October 6, 1997

Well, I'm not a historian but, I believe, the Texas Revolution marked Houston's first time in military command.  (If not, I'm sure Kevin will jump in and correct me!)  If so, what a maiden voyage he had!

I would definitely give him high marks at any rate.  He had no small task keeping up the morale of his troops during a prolonged retreat in the fact of the enemy.  He masterfully conserved his resources until the time was right to strike and then strike he did -- most effectively.

It was a Texas-sized gamble and it paid off.

He was most definitely helped by Santa Anna's ineptitude but I don't thing that detracts at all from the way he conducted himself.  I can't think of anything he might have done better.  He played the hand dealt him most deftly.

Now if you want to talk about Fannin -- now there's another (sad) story!

Chuck Chappell

From: Jeff Pendleton
Date: October 7, 1997

I have just read Mr. Hardin's article on Sam Houston and while I greatly respect his opinion (I think his book is the best Alamo book yet.) I have to differ with him on Sam's military acumen.

Let me preface this with my pedigree. I'm nothing more than an amateur historian, but I have spent 11 years on active duty with the U.S. Marines, and have learned a little bit about strategy and a good bit about tactics. In my opinion, Sam Houston had skills in both areas.

Sam the strategist saw no benefit in trying to maintain and defend static defensive positions such as the forts at Goliad and Bexar. But when his orders were disobeyed by Travis and Bowie, Sam the tactician saw the value in the delaying action the Alamo siege created. Did he want it to happen? Did he cause it to happen? No, but when it happened he tried to take advantage of the time that the Alamo's martyrs gave him to evacuate noncombatants, organize his forces and seek more advantageous strategic position. (Not to take away from the romanticism of men choosing to stand and die rather for their cause, but THIS is the true military value derived from the Alamo massacre. This and the motivational value it had on the core of Houston's army. Without the Alamo and Goliad, the men at San Jacinto would not have had the hate and anger that it takes to attack and kill without regard to personal safety. What some call bravery.)

Sam the strategist reasoned that Santa Anna would not invade until the spring. But when he found different(good move on Santa Anna's part) Sam the strategist wisely fell back in order to organize rather than attempt a defenseless defense. I have no doubt that his intention was to continue his retrograde movement all the way to the Sabine, gathering more men to his army and stretching Santa Anna's already stretched logistics train to the breaking point. He may have been caught with his pants down by the Mexican army's sudden appearance in Texas, but he then looked and saw their one biggest weakness. Resupply. And he knew that his force was no match for a real army. He had been in a real army, and evidently was the only one to see this. While all the others were arguing over how many Mexican soldiers one Texian could kill with his bare hands, Sam was recognizing that Texas' one best hope was the U.S. Army camp in Louisiana. I think he meant to force a confrontation between the American and Mexican armies. Who knows... Maybe Jackson had given him reason to think that would happen.

As far as his apparent indecision at the "whichway tree"...the situation was a very fluid one, with lots of rumor but little hard intelligence. I think he may have let his army make the decision. Sort of like flipping a coin. Because all logic pointed toward the left...and retrograde.

Sam's critics like to leave out some things at San Jacinto that I think are important and show his tactical abilities.

Allowing Santa Anna to be reinforced at San Jacinto is often pointed to as an example of Houston's ineptitude. I disagree. Sam the tactician knew his army had one good attack in them. A drawn out battle would not go his way and once the attack began there would be no command and control over his poorly trained group. Defending against reinforcements would be impossible. His comment about "not taking two bites out of a cherry" was not just macho posturing. Sam knew his army's limitations.

And he knew his men were mad; mad at the Mexican army, mad at their own commander. And he made use of that anger. He knew that it would take that anger to make a poorly trained smaller force beat a larger, professional one. He goaded his men in a sense. And when Deaf Smith burned the bridge at their back door, it was the final catalyst. The were spurred into a murderous rampage that provided Sam his one punch knockout. As I said above, Sam knew his force couldn't fight a sustained battle.

I don't believe I'm partisan; Sam Houston made lots of mistakes. But I put myself in his position and I have to say, I don't know what I would have done different. I know that Sam Houston was no Napoleon, no Alexander. I think instead he borrowed some of his tactics from another general who had fought a war against a professional army with nothing more than volunteer civilians--George Washington.

Jeff Pendleton

From: Kevin R. Young
Date: 10 Oct 1997

I have read with interest the responses of Chuck Chappell and Jeff Pendleton to Steve Hardin's evaluation of Sam Houston as a military commander. To paraphrase an old toast: "God favors sailors, drunks and Sam Houston."

Houston did have some military command experience. As an ensign in the U.S. Regulars, he led a forlorn hope against a fortified Indian wood cabin at Horseshoe Bend during the Creek Wars. He also got a good number of his men killed and himself shot. But young brash lieutenants are allowed to make mistakes. Middle age generals should not.

I would have to ask Chuck to clarify his position that Houston kept up the morale of his army during the retreat. From the period accounts, morale was never up, except at the Guadalupe when it was thought he would fight there. The Texian Army was at its strongest at Gonzales and at the Colorado.

After that, during the run to the Brazos and the San Jacinto it was greatly weakened by volunteers leaving to evacuate their families. I would also have to question that comment that he conserved his resources: the only resource he had was the army, and it was Rusk, Turner, Caldwell and the others who kept it together. Thomas Rusk's appearance in the camp strengthened what morale there was. If Houston did not intend to fight, then at least the Government would (despite the fact that with the army now moving east from the Brazos, the government was forced to flee to Harrisburg and then Galveston).

I am sorry Chuck, but I feel the evidence shows that the army made the strike, not Houston.

Concerning Chuck's comments about Fannin: it seems you have bought the Houston version hook, line and sinker. Houston started the Fannin bashing the minute the Alamo fell. In fact, he started Travis and Bowie bashing, but in reading the mood of the army, realized that Travis and Bowie were viewed as heroes, so he turned his focus instead to Fannin.

While I have a lot of problems with Fannin as a field commander, I think this comparison is a little unfair. This, especially in the light that Fannin faced José Cosmé Urrea, one of the best light cavalry commanders in Mexican service.

Bottom line is this: Houston tried to lay the blame on the Alamo's fall on Fannin, despite the fact that Houston himself is to blame. Fannin was not questioning Travis' dispatches-Houston did.

Now, Jeff raises some interesting points, but to be honest, his constant reference to Houston in the familiar first name makes me think this was intended for Houston's ears.

I respect that you served 14 years in the Marine Corps, but alas, and please do not take offense, Marine Corps Training does not include Scott's Tactics or Napoleonic style warfare.

I have to ask the age old question: What orders were there to blow up the Alamo? When someone finds this magic bullet, please let me know.

Did Houston use the Alamo to evacuate the noncombatants, organize his forces and seek a more advantageous strategic position? Only in the movies.

Remember, Houston arrived at Gonzales to join the army on March 11 and 12th. Travis and his men had been toasted over a week. Burleson and Sherman have already organized the army: Baker is building defensive breastworks at the crossing. Houston isn't in town less than 48 hours when word arrives that the Alamo fell a week before.

He arrests the two Tejanos who brought the word and it is only when Sue Dickinson shows up, does he lets the word out.The retreat from Gonzales was anything but organized--why do you think they called it the "Runaway Scrape"?

No effort to train or organize the army occurred until Groce's efforts on the Brazos-nearly three weeks after the Alamo's fall with the Mexicans right on their heals.

All this talk about "resupply" is interesting. I can buy that premise for San Antonio and Goliad, and even Gonzales, but not the Colorado or the Brazos.

Houston allowed the enemy into the very heart of Texas: everything Stephen Austin had built was destroyed, not by the Mexicans but by Houston. What a great battle plan. . .get a third country involved in the war. The question I have to ask is do you think the US Army could have won such a fight, especially with most of its army and southern militia being sent to Florida to fight what turned out to be the longest, most expensive Indian War in US history? Would the anti-slave element in Congress allow Jackson to fight what many viewed as a Mexican civil war, being waged by a nation who had laws against slavery against one that wanted slavery. Of course, this is historical hindsighting.

Everyone seems to forget that right in the middle of the San Jacinto battle Houston tried to get his army to stop to fire a second volley. Now that was pretty amazing, especially for those who like this idea of the Texians only having one fight in them.

It was Rusk who saved the day. He saw the disaster in such a move, and ordered the men to surge forward. Five minutes could have made a considerable difference at San Jacinto, especially if the crew of the Mexican artillery had enough time to fire two more rounds.

I could go on, but what's the point. It appears that we want Richard Dix, Joel McCrea, Sam Elliot and Richard Boone on that horse at San Jacinto, not the complex man who really was there. Houston was one lucky man -- and the Texas Revolution proves it. Also, it helps when your own children are still alive during the Texas Centennial, or at the formation of the State Historical Association!

Yes, God favors sailors, drunks and Sam Houston. But that is no comfort to the men who sat waiting in the Alamo facing the Mexican troops their commander and chief was swearing weren't in Texas.

Date: Sun, 12 Oct 1997
From: Jeff Pendleton

Wow! You really got it in for old Sam, don't ya! Let me see if I can't at least get my hands up in front of my face to defend against that awesome attack.

First of all, while I'm not trying to speak for Mr. Chappell, let me say this about command experience, mistakes and young brash lieutenants.

My opinion is that the most valuable experience Sam...I'm sorry...Houston took away from Horseshoe Bend was the horror of war, the fog of battle and a healthy respect for the enemy; whether naked savage or poorly trained conscript. I know of no command decision mistakes he made there. In fact I know of no large decisions he made at all. As you pointed out, he was a mere lieutenant. his job was to take the battle plan made by higher ups and execute it. Which he did with extreme prejudice. His courage was what was displayed that day. I mention that because of all the men who would later write of him as a coward. I think any historian could look dispassionately at Sam Houston and realize that whatever made him take the actions he did in the Texas Revolution, cowardice was not among them.

Now, as to my pedigree; no, they do not study Napoleonic style warfare at Paris Island, nor Scott's Tactics at OCS. But you may be surprised by what is still studied. I'm sure that on one of the many marine websites you may find the marine required reading list. It was started by Commandant Al Gray in the late 80's. Depending on your rank, a marine is required to study warfare from Sun Tzu to Machiavelli to Mao. Rogers rules on guerrilla warfare comes to mind as a for instance. We studied and borrowed from it. How do we know Sam...Houston...didn't?

What orders were there to blow up the Alamo? Well, here is where we come to the real problem. You don't accept anything Houston says, but you seem willing to accept all other sources of info. If Sam... General Houston...told you the sky was blue you would want some second opinion. Why do you find it so hard to believe that Houston ordered the Alamo destroyed or at least not fortified and held? I wouldn't make a stand there. A delaying action possibly, but not a stand. Would you?

As for arresting the Tejano messengers. Good move Sam. Panic is a terrible thing. He was trying to control the information. I would have done the same.

As for your criticism of his training schedule...as you say, with the Mexican army on his heels, the texicans had their hands full evacuating themselves and the noncombatants. Some guerilla tactics would have been good here, but that takes well-trained men also. Sam didn't have that. The first chance they had for even rudimentary training was at the Brazos.

Your comments about resupply confuse me. Are you suggesting that The Mexican Army could solve their resupply problems at the Colorado and Brazos Rivers by a water route? I believe the small Texas Navy did a pretty good job of preventing that from happening. And even if it didn't, you keep forgetting-You can't look thru the eyes of a historian 150 years later, but of the men on the ground then, with the intel[ligence] assets they had. Drawing out the Mexican army supply lines is an outstanding tactic.

Your criticism of trading Texas land for time is amusing. Russia used the same strategy against Germany in WWII. And it worked. In both cases they traded something they had...land...for something they needed...time.

Now we are getting to the no-brainers. Yes, getting a third country, especially a sympathetic parent country (In the sense that most Texicans were from the U.S.) whose leader is a bud. And there is no question that the U.S., troops strategically positioned on the other side of the Sabine could have taken Santa Anna's army in the field. Once again...resupply. Believe it or not, it is the big deal. And you should know (old Jackson knew) that the fighting would have been over way before any opposition

Blaming Houston...I mean Sam...for not knowing the Mexicans were in Texas is funny. I believe that is a mistake everyone made. (Do I recall something about the Alamo defenders attending a VFW dance in Bexar the night before Santa Anna's forces arrived) As I said in my first letter, which was one shrewd move on Santa Anna's part.

Was Sam Houston lucky? Yes, sometimes. And unlucky others. He was also an opportunist and a shrewd politician. But don't take away from him his bravery and his leadership skills. C'mon Kevin, give your devil his due.

From: Kevin R. Young
Date: 12 Oct 1997

Jeff, Despite what you have tried to interpret from my response, I do not have it in for "Old Sam." On the contrary, I admire his pro-Indian stand, particularly since it flew in the face of his old master, Jackson, and his pro-Union stance of 1861. Houston was one complex character: certainly far more complex than the hero worshiping books, articles and movies on him have been. If you follow their logic, everyone in the Texas Revolution was an idiot and only Houston himself was the defined master of the Texian universe. It is like Stephen Austin hit the ground with his surveying stick and up rose Sam Houston on Sachem, sword in one hand and the plans for the San Jacinto Campaign in the other.

I do not have it in for Old Sam--that is any easy way to try to discredit my comments. What I have it in for is the historiography that has credited this one sided view of Houston's role in Texas history. All you have to do is look at Eugene C. Barker's early career when he attempted to publish the massive responses to Houston's Senate Speech on the San Jacinto Campaign. The Houston family, who had clout with UT and the THSA, put the pressure to bear, and Barker was writing retractions.

The problem concerning the so-called "blow up the Alamo" order is not with my hesitance to accept what Houston stated after the fact, but rather what you have taken to be some grand planned and great strategy. If Houston had said that the sky was blue, I would simply look at the sky and see that it was blue. Ok. Then Houston was right. So with the so-called order to blow up the Alamo, I can not simply look at the order, because, it is not there. I can read the document where he ordered the fortifications in Bejar destroyed, and recommended that the Alamo be abandoned and the artillery pull back to Gonzales and to Victoria (apparently, he did have some idea of making a possible defense line on the Guadalupe), but I can not read the order to Bowie ordering the Alamo to be blown up, because it is not there. Of course, I can read the letters written in the aftermath of the Alamo where Houston says he ordered the Alamo blown up, but I am sorry, that is an after the fact letter.

It is the only first example of Houston claiming one thing in the face of the other. Most of the participants in the retreat remember that Houston ordered Gonzales burned. He claimed he did, and then claimed he didn't. He did the same thing at San Felipe, trying to lay the blame on his political rival, Mosely Baker. I am not arguing the right and wrong of the destructions of these two communities, especially if you so admire what Uncle Joe Stalin did to the Ukraine in World War Two. But it is an example of Houston, in the heat of the fire, claimed he gave orders and then claimed he didn't give orders. What do you trust? Do you through out the other participant accounts simply because they disagree with Houston's version?

I think that Travis, Bowie and more importantly, James C. Neill had a good idea. Meet the enemy on the frontier. Keep them out of the populated part of Texas. Protect the cabins, farms and towns-and families from destruction.

Also, they knew that the convention was meeting at Washington-on-the-Brazos (since both the town and the garrison sent delegates there). They knew how critical that meeting was to the political future of Texas (those sympathetic with Texas in the States would not support a Mexican civil war, but would support the creation of an independent nation who would seek annexation to the U.S.-this is not hind sighting--read the period documents) They also knew that blocking the Camino Real was the key (Neil was from Bastrop). Thus San Antonio should be defended.

If you would look at Fannin's reports to Robinson, they clearly knew the Mexicans were at Presidio Rio Grande and Matamoros. But they expected them to move later in the spring. Fannin had plans to move part of his garrison to San Antonio to reinforce the Alamo (expected timetable was first of March). But of course, Urrea and Santa Anna moved sooner and quicker than thought.

Travis is not defending the Alamo to buy time. He is defending the Alamo because he had too (almost suprised) and because he fully expected help to come. Volunteers were on the way. The convention learned of the Alamo siege on February 28th. The siege was just to quick. This does not excuse, as you would have it, Houston's increditable delay in getting from Washington-on-the-Brazos to Gonzales. Yes, I know the after-the-fact line about how he had to stay to keep the Convention on track. But even when ordered to the Alamo by the Convention, he still took a very long time to make what was a short trip.

I grant you Fannin and Travis were both guilty of a lack of believing what the local Tejanos were telling them: that a load of hurt was coming quicker than they thought. Fannin's volunteers from the U.S. antagonizing the local Tejanos, who were already not keen about separation from Mexico (but would fight for the Constitution of 1824) did not help the Goliad situation.

When it became clear that the Mexicans were on their way, by simple reason that Travis was under siege and Urrea was at San Patricio, I find it amazing that Houston would not believe his own commanders in the field.

As late as March 8, Houston was telling people at the Colorado that Travis and Fannin were politicking and that there were no Mexicans troops at San Antonio or approaching Goliad. Now, whether you want to believe that account or not is up to you.

I was not the one engaging in historical hindsighting, but rather was responding to your insights into what Houston had planned by, as you felt, getting to the Sabine and drawing the U.S. Army into the fight. I do not know where you drew the conclusion that I felt the Mexican supply lines would be better once they got past the Colorado, and I certainly made no reference to the Mexican Navy trying to supply them or that the Mexican Navy could out run the Texas Navy. My references were to the Texians.

I would have to ask what supply lines??? The Quarter Master departments of both forces were non-existent. If you think the Mexicans were getting supplies from bases in Mexico you are wrong--they were living off the land, which, despite the destruction of Gonzales and San Felipe was all they were still able to do.

The Texians had it even worse. The rain during the campaign made moving anything by wagon impossible. Supply lines had nothing to do with the defeat of the Mexican Army in Texas. Nothing at all. The nearly 4000 Mexican troops still on the Brazos were pulled out of Texas because Filisola followed Santa Anna's orders to retreat the army. Urrea went nuts over this! Now, Filisola reasoned that the Mexicans could reform at Bexar and Goliad, and perhaps turn Copano into a resupply depot, but the chief reason was because Santa Anna got himself captured.

The great fluke--an army gives up the territory and the military advantage that was gained because one small division gets taken out. Was Santa Anna that important to the operations of the army? We will never know, because Filisola followed the order (which the Mexican government later said he shouldn't) and pulled the bulk of the army back. It was on that retreat that the Mexican suffered. That retreat, and not the advance, is what broke the morale of the army.

By the way, I never find anything concerning the destruction of private property, the forced evacuation of women and children (many whom died during it) and the wreck of a country amusing. Total war is a terrible concept. And I always thought that it was the Russian winter that did both the French and the Germans in.

May I ask what U.S. troops were stationed strategically on the U.S. border? The troops on what could be considered the U.S. and Mexican border where there to protect settlers from Indians (and for that matter, Indians from Indians). The U.S. garrisons were at Fort Jesup, Fort Towson (Red River) and Fort Gibson. The commanding general of the region, General Gaines, was in Floridia from January to April fighting Seminoles. The concentrating of troops occurred only after San Jacinto.

Gaines started to order troops from Gibson and Towson to head for Jesup in late March, but most did not receive their orders to move until after San Jacinto. Gaines was a supporter of the Texian cause, but when he ordered several states to organize militias for frontier defense, the governors did not do so. There was a little matter of the Treaty of 1819 between Spain and the United States, which was extended to Mexico. Gaines used the Indian issue as his reason for getting troops to Fort Jesup, because he believed that the Mexican Army after San Jacinto was still a threat-as did many Texians. The Fort Parker Massacre gave him a real excuse to move troops into Nacogdoches, but that was not until the summer of 1836. The Mexicans and the Anti-Jackson party went nuts. The troops were pulled.

Bottom line to "no-brainier" is this: had Houston's army pulled up the Sabine in April of 1836 with the Mexicans behind it, the only U.S. Regulars who would have been there were what was stationed at Jesup. It would take a month to pull the troops from Gibson and Townson (and there weren't a lot) to Jesup. And Gaines may or may not have been there.

A war with Mexico, despite what you may feel, in 1836 with a serious war in Florida going on, would have been a political and military disaster. The American Army of 1836 was not yet the American Army of 1846. There was already massive opposition to US involvement in Texas-read the Congressional Records.

In closing, let share with you a way I research. When it comes to hot issues like this one, I take the opposite camp at first and try to gather all the evidence in favor of it. In this case, I took the pro-Houston view, but the weight of evidence, persuades me differently. One man's account of his personal actions is balanced with a host of others who witnessed and experienced the same. Those of you who worship at the Houston shrine may continue to do so. But when I stand on the plains of San Jacinto I think not of your hero winning his laurels, but rather Sidney Sherman, Tom Rusk, John Wharton, Mosely Baker, Robert Coleman, Antonio Menchaca, Uncle Jimmy Curtis, Three Legged Willie Williamson, and the other brave souls who rushed across that prairie with only two thoughts on their mind. And I thank goodness that they did remembered Alamo and Goliad. I have developed this lack of concern about who was on the big white horse, but rather have focused on those who remembered.

God does favor sailors and drunks. And he favored Sam Houston. That is what history really shows us.

As for my experience, I have worked with the U.S. Military and have friends who have taught at the U.S.M.A. and The Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. I have planned and executed staff rides for the officers of the U.S. Army, the British Army and, for that matter, the Mexican Army. I also have twenty-two years of practical experience in the running of a early 19th century unit, including campaign conditions for over a week. Many of the things you have read about happening in the Texas Revolution I have experienced first hand. including moving a large military force from over 80 miles in period conditions with a hostile force behind us. I have commanded a company, a brigade and served on division levels with 19th century military units numbering 1300 men and in once case, served three days with a force of nearly 8000 19th century soldiers in period conditions. I know a good deal about about flintlocks in all conditions, moving artillery and wagons on muddy dirt roads and taking care of a 19th century army in the field.

Now, when did I call Sam Houston a coward? You are putting words in my mouth. I never called him a coward, but I did question his version of the San Jacinto Campaign.

Lt. Houston, already wounded, led a forlorn hope at Horseshoe Bend. What do you think a forlorn hope is? It is a small band of assaulters who go against an fortified enemy position. Most of the get killed. Houston almost got killed. He sure got wounded enough that day! My point was simple, that forlorn hope was the last combat Houston would see until San Jacinto. Houston had a remarkable habit of being in the front of a charge, and getting wounded, since he did it both times in the only two real battles he ever fought in! When the firing started, Houston was no coward.

Houston had incredible highs and lows-which I don't think you can argue about if you look at his career. Even at San Jacinto, when he saw Rusk walking the surrendered Almonte and the Mexican prisoners back on the field, he thought Mexican reinforcements had arrived and cried, "All is lost!" until Turner pointed out the error.

Date: October 15, 1997
From: Chuck Chappell

Kevin: my previous comments were my own and not in response to anything.

Jeff: thanks for not speaking for me. It's a courtesy that's been in short supply from some on this page in the past. (Heck, even now, I'm attributed some kind of knowledge of Mr. Hardin's article on Sam Houston. I wonder what I read?) Semper Fi. Former US Navy Aviation here but I won't hold it against ya! ;-)

Now, to say that the rules of warfare were suspended and supply lines didn't count during the Texan revolution sounds pretty absurd to me. If they mattered for Napoleon during his invasion of Russia in 1812, how could they not matter for the Mexican invasion of Texas in 1836? When you amass a large number of people in a concentrated area -- logistics count. "An army marches on its stomach." -- Napoleon.

Also to rush out and meet the enemy on the frontier (presumably halfway to the Rio Grande) when he is his strongest so that we might "Keep them out of the populated part of Texas. Protect the cabins, farms and towns-and families from destruction." sounds like pretty lame strategizing to me. You simply don't make strategic (or any other important) decisions based such emotional claptrap. Besides, those pesky supply lines (that are so unimportant) of ours would be equally stretched out there on the frontier. Not to mention the whole idea of choosing the battle ground -- something that seemed to work pretty good for us at San Jacinto. And as for that terrible decision (and probably others like it) to burn Goliad that Houston made or didn't make -- that's how you conduct a scorched earth campaign. Criticisms like these are in the same league as those that say Texans were fighting for slavery -- what a joke. That's like saying if I go to war, I'm fighting for the Trump towers. Give me a break. Good men go to war to defend home and hearth -- period -- unless you want to characterize the entire Texan male population as adventurers or mercenaries. But, I digress. And, before you say it Kevin, yes, sometime you destroy the village to save it. That's one of the many reasons war is hell.

As for clarifying my position that Houston kept up the morale of his troops, it's really pretty straight-forward. He was in command. It's well known that they retreated long distances in the campaign over extended periods of time under what you describe yourself as very arduous conditions. Yet, when they were needed, they were there in sufficient numbers to get the job done.

Nuff said.

That's not to take anything away from Houston's Lieutenants. I share your inspiration of their feats and would like to learn more about Thomas Rusk et al. I'm only to saying that, as the man in command, Houston gets high marks. (I believe he was the one who accepted the Santa Anna's surrender in the last history book I saw -- that is if it hasn't been rewritten yet!) Also, to say Houston didn't keep up the morale of the troops just because the history books recorded a lot of hooting and hollering when another more popular guy comes on the scene -- ala Rusk -- is to show a profound ignorance of what Leadership is. After all if "Thomas Rusk's appearance in the camp strengthened what morale there was." presumably there was a camp for Rusk to appear in -- courtesy, in large part I'd bet, of the efforts of Sam Houston. I don't claim to have the magic formula but one thing is certainly clear from what I've studied and observed and from those whom I've had the privilege to serve under and with: leadership does *not* simply equal popularity. That definition of Leadership parallels the rice-paper-thin definition our illustrious broadcast media likes to assign to a "hero" -- what a joke. As for Fannin -- I think there is plenty of historical evidence to show the man couldn't make up his mind. And to paraphrase as towering a figure -- and about the purist definition of leadership I can imagine -- Winston Churchill: In a critical situation, the best thing you can do is the right thing -- the next best thing you can do is the wrong thing -- the worst thing you can do is nothing! Sounds like Fannin violated an axiom from The Master to me.

And finally, Kevin, since you have featured what appears to be "military" qualifications so prominently in your previous post, I feel compelled to say that if I want some research done on the historical record, I'll call ya. (Especially the documented record!) But, if I want someone's judgment on leadership -- I'll take the word of a Marine like Jeff any day. There is, after all, a substantial difference between "working with" the military and living the military for 14 years. As there is also a difference in studying leadership in the historical record and living leadership in our armed forces. And, of course, there's a difference simulating historical battle conditions -- presumably with historical "hostile" forces -- and the real thing.

Interesting insights on Houston in your closing remarks. But nothing that makes him any less of a leader in my eyes.

Remember the Alamo -- and Semper Fi!

Chuck Chappell

Date: 16 Oct 1997
From: Kevin R. Young

I am happy that the U.S. Marines and Sam Houston are so well thought of. Keep worshipping at that Houston shrine.

I think you misunderstood my comments about the supply lines. Supply lines are an important part of any campaign. The point I was trying (and I repeat-trying) to make was that the concept of an active supply system is not applicable in the case of the Texas Revolution. While Santa Anna secured San Antonio, Goliad and Copano for a basis, the simple fact of the matter was that there were not supply trains moving up and down the Camino Real or the Matamoros Road. Just read Andrade's reports from San Antonio following the capture of the Alamo.

The Texians had a similar problem. I will agree that the retreating Texas Army pulled Santa Anna away from his new bases and put the Texians closer to the only sure haven they would have--the United States. Also look at what Santa Anna did: Urrea's goal was Brazoria, Gaona Nacogdoches, Sesma San Felipe. Then the Mexican army was concentrated on the Brazos. The screw up was when Santa Anna took a division, broke ahead of the rest of the army, and took out after the fleeing Texian government (not a good move).

Both armies were living off the land. The destruction of Gonzales and San Felipe did not hamper Mexican supply or their advance. The Texians did not pull an "Uncle Joe Stalin" and destroy everything.

One of the great beauties of historical hind-sighting is that it doesn't cost you a thing. After all, it wasn't your farms, homes, towns that were destroyed nor were your families in the Runaway Scrape.

Alas, I figured you ex-servicemen would say to hell with all of your experience--if you weren't a real veteran, your opinion wouldn't be worth beans. Sorry, but all I was trying to do was explain that I do have some first hand experience on handling a 19th Century military force and am aware what the modern military is teaching. I guess then you must have the same negative comments about John Keagan, David Chandler, and Dennis Hart Mahan, who taught military science at the U.S.M.A during the first half of the 19th Century. Mahan, whose students included Grant, Lee, Jackson and most of the other greats of the Civil War, never fought in a battle either.

If you so question my ability to evaluate military science, particular of the 18th and 19th century, then you should not bother with consulting me on the "documents." The documents are merely the written record. Without the understanding of the times, the events and the people, they are pretty worthless. Since you apparently think that I am so terribly lacking in this area, then the second area is moot.

Oh yes--Fannin made a lot of mistakes. I think if he had ignored Houston's final order to pull back and reinforced Ward at Refugio instead, Urrea's advance may have been stopped.Ward was winning. Fannin, the guy everyone loves to hate, finally obeyed Houston's order. That is to order Ward to pull out of the Refugio fight and retreat to Victoria. Then after playing around, Fannin pulled out of Goliad. He gave Urrea the perfect advantage--especially to someone so skilled as a cavalry commander. Poor Fannin. He was a good organizer, but a bad field commander.

Of course, as you have noted, I should not be allowed to comment on military science and tactics.

By the way, Fannin's aide de camp was John Sowers Brooks, former corporal of the U.S. Marine Corps (U.S.S. Constitution) the only U.S. Marine that we know of who participated in the Texas Revolution.

As a conclusion I can only say this. Believe what you want to believe in. For some people the story of the Alamo is that of a historical event: for others it is a lesson in human courage. For others it is a classic example of American imperialism. It is many things to many people. Take from it what you will.

Date: October 20, 1997
From: Jeff Pendleton

Okay, I'll wade into this one more time then I'm through and you guys can have the last word. I'll take your last letter Kevin, and refute, agree, ridicule and commend as I see fit. Here goes.

I think we both misunderstand each other's comments in regards to supply lines. You are right in that there were no Mexican army supply lines...yet. (But where I think you and I part ways on much of this is that you look at these events as past history. You are taking records, commentaries and official documents to paint the whole picture. That is what a historian is supposed to do. But it is easy to correct mistakes with 150 some odd years of 20/20 hindsight. I'm saying look at the intel available to the commander on the ground at the time. What did Houston know? What did he consider reliable intel? What did he do with what info he had? Judge him...and all history's figures...from that viewpoint.) There soon would have to be some supply lines however if the Mexican army would hope to stay in the field as an army. This living off the land stuff can only go so far. There were no crops in the fields and feeding such an army off what they found in the Texan civilian's storehouses and larders and corrals would go just so far. Men on the move eat a lot. And food is just one part of logistics. There are no cannonball trees in Texas and powder-even cheap Mexican powder- was a scarce commodity to the Texans. There is no doubt that resupply would become a critical issue very very soon.

You are right on the money when you say that Santa Anna screwed up when he divided his forces but in fairness to him he really believed that he had already won the war. As you recall, he had at first intended to head on back to Mexico, letting his generals do the mopping up.

As for Fannin, I'm not real interested in discussing him. He was an unproven commander, like many in this war. He lacked decisiveness and authority. But he died bravely.

I never even suggested you should not be allowed to comment on military tactics. I would not be writing here if I thought that. And Mr. Chappel seems to be congenial. I'm sure he would agree that it is wonderful to be able to argue with a professional historian on these matters. Again, I'm not sure what you're talking about. If this is a reference to some past argument that didn't include the folks here, why mention it here?

Yes, I knew that there was a marine in Fannin's command. What is your point?

And finally, what is this talk at the end of your letter about American imperialism? Please tell me what nation in history...or present for that matter...that wasn't nationalistic and imperialistic if the opportunity afforded it? It is the nature of human beings. At least since the Cain and Abel we have been trying to one-up our neighbor. The United States has done its share but lets not be apologists for history.

Date: October 21, 1997
From: Chuck Chappell

I'll restrict my comments to a basic "amen" to Jeff's previous post and let the last words be Kevin's if he so chooses -- whether those words involve military matters or otherwise!

It's always interesting to read what you've got to say Kevin.  Thanks for the effort you put into your work.  You obviously love what you do and it shows.  This web site continues to be a favorite stop of mine on the "infamaiton suuupa hioway" (ever see that obnoxious AT&T commercial?) and, assuming I haven't worn out my welcome, I'll continue to stop by and jump in every now and then.

Take care and, of course ...

Remember the Alamo,
Semper Fi and Go Navy! ;-)

Chuck Chappell

Date: October 23, 1997
From: Kevin R. Young

Not even God can change history.

I think we agree on several factors here, but I again feel that you are missing my main point.  You all seem to feel that Houston was a fantastic strategist for the San Jacinto Campaign.  I, on the other hand, being a great believer in time and place, think that Sam lucked out big time.  That is not historical hindsighting, nor I am trying to correct mistakes.  What I am offering is a different perspective on the concept that the San Jacinto campaign was a planned affair.  I think it was not, other than one point we both agree on-that Houston was probably heading for the Sabine to try and get US Army support until the army turned at the fork in the road.

I agree with you also that the entire supply problem was horribly improvised. On both sides.  Just read Andrade's letters from San Antonio and you will get a perfect picture of how screwed up it was on the Mexican end-and they were a professional, organized army!

I also agree that Santa Anna did believe he had won the war when he got to the Brazos.  He even was planning on heading back to Mexico.  Never, never underestimate any enemy force in front of you!

We could start a whole new debate on Fannin.  Again, good organizer, lousy field commander.  I lived on site when I worked at Presidio La Bahia, and Fannin was shot about ten feet from my back door.

The Marine reference was simply for your information.  I helped get the Marine Corps flag for the memorial display at the Presidio La Bahia.  Brooks letters are great stuff-both historically and interpretively. Always had a soft spot for him-it was great in 1986 when flowers showed up from his hometown in Virginia to be carried in the Sesquicentennial memorial service at the Presidio and gravesite.

I would also like to note that you may be misunderstanding what I have said in relation to what others have said.  It is a common problem.  I remember at one joint US-Mexican conference that the speaker used several period quotes from participants.  During the question and answer period, someone from the audience spoke up-in raged that the speaker had such a low opinion of Mexican culture.

The speaker tried to remind the person that he was quoting a period participant source, not expressing his own thoughts.  But the person in the crowd only heard what he wanted to.

So that is to say, I did not suggest that it is my personal opinion professionally and otherwise that the Alamo is a symbol of American imperialism.  What I was trying to say is that the Alamo is a symbol of values.  To many it is a shrine: to others it is place of human courage, and others have a negative view of it and the historical experience.  You have to understand that to understand the Alamo as not only a historical site but a popular culture symbol.  Our Mexican neighbors, for the most part, have a very different view of this country's westward expansion.  So do most of their historians.  You have to simply understand that before you can start any real communication with them on the historical interpretation of the period.  You have to respect that the Alamo is a place where people come to reinforce their values and beliefs-many of which you personally may not agree with.  I know people who don't care one thing about the battle and its participants, but rather remember the site was the place where the families were first taken into the Catholic Church and are buried.

So please do not confuse my personal beliefs about the Alamo, Texas and the United States with what others feel about it.

Keep asking questions.  It is what we all do to keep historical interpretation expanding.  And if I might close with my adopted regimental saying "Cottonbalers By God! Damn Fine Soldiers."
 

Kevin R. Young.
 

I have followed with considerable bemusement the reaction to my article, "The San Jacinto Campaign: The Generalship of Sam Houston." I have avoided weighing in on the matter because Mr. Young was doing such a fine job advancing my position--and I was enjoying following the debate from the sidelines. I had an entire article in which to express my views; I wished to make certain that others had an opportunity to air their opinions as well. Now, however, propriety demands that I speak for myself and enter the fray.

Let me assure readers that I am not a jaded revisionist out to denigrate the memory of time-honored heroes. Like most Texans, I cut my teeth on the Houston legend. I named my first-born son Sam Houston Hardin, so how much could I hate the general? No, I do not hate Sam Houston. At the same time, however, I do not admire him as much as I once did. That change of regard came about during the research phase of Texian Iliad. The passage of time and the continued study of the San Jacinto Campaign has only intensified my belief that the general-while deserving some credit-did not warrant as many commendations as he assumed.

I wished to offer a balanced critical analysis of the San Jacinto Campaign and General Houston's role in it based on sources that traditional historians never bothered to consult--or ignored if they did. The French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, once observed: "There are no final truths. The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the right questions." Since Houston and his supporters shaped so much of the early history, and because so many modern historians simply accepted the earlier interpretations, I hoped to ask the proper questions.

That's not as easy as it seems. The sources provide serious problems. Considering Robert M. Coleman's Houston Displayed, the late John H. Jenkins's contended:

That is not to say Houston was so biased that historians should simply dismiss his every utterance. Historians should question everything--especially if it comes from sources hostile to Houston. Historians should question everything--especially if it comes from sources favorable to Houston. Historians should question everything,--especially if it comes from sources that betray no bias and so probably stem from people who were not participants in the event. I tried to question everything. Sometimes I defend Houston's actions, but more often I find cause to criticize his actions.

Mr. Chappell noted that "Kevin [would] jump in and correct [him]." True to expectation, Mr. Young has once again performed yeoman service. Since Mr. Young and I fundamentally agree on Houston's conduct during the campaign, and since he did such a fine job expressing our view, I will not bore readers by plowing that ground again.

Mr. Chappell and Mr. Pendleton cling to the traditional belief that the retreat to Buffalo Bayou was a brilliant strategic withdrawal and that San Jacinto was Houston's "one-punch knockout." Problem is, neither gentleman provides any new information supporting such a view. They rely on the highly dubious method of second guessing what Houston might have intended based on what a good marine would have done in similar circumstances.

God bless the U.S. Marine Corps. It has distinguished itself across the globe for the valor and professionalism of its personnel. Mr. Chappell and Mr. Pendleton can be justly proud of their association with such a gallant institution. Still-and this is the point-one makes a fundamental error when he attempts to understand or explain the motivations of a nineteenth-century citizen soldier by the professional standards of late twentieth-century Marine Corps doctrine. One may allege that certain considerations should have been on Houston's mind-but were they? Mr. Chappell and Mr. Pendleton provide no new information regarding Houston's actions, but only conjecture based on their experience. Certainly training can inform one's understanding of historical events, but it strikes me as pernicious to assume one can simply transfer that training and experience across time and space.

The main point of my article was that Houston, by his own admission, never intended to go to Buffalo Bayou. He never planned to deliver his "knock-out punch" at San Jacinto. I also assert that most of the Texian army despised their commander and expressed contempt for his ability. Either Houston sanctioned the retreat to Buffalo Bayou, or he did not. Either San Jacinto was the culmination of Houston's strategic plan, or it was not. Either his soldiers had confidence in Houston's abilities, or they did not. Given that, I posed two simple questions. If Houston never intended to go to San Jacinto, how could that battle have been the culmination of his brilliant withdrawal strategy? Consequently, if the battle was not the culmination of Houston's planning, then how can anyone reasonably maintain that Houston was a great general?

Despite pages of conjecture, second guessing, and "what ifs," neither Mr. Chappell nor Mr. Pendleton provide answers to those two central questions. I presented documentary evidence to support my interpretation. If one disagrees, that's fine. But refute my evidence. This they have not done. Until someone does, I will continue to profess that--notwithstanding his many other noteworthy achievements--Sam Houston was not a great general. Indeed, he was not even a competent one.

Stephen L. Hardin

Views expressed are not necessarily those of
"The Second Flying Company of Alamo de Parras"